Post-interventionist security assistance is premised on non-normative security understandings and pragmatic and flexible arrangements between external and local actors. In practice, the hybrid nature of many political regimes or the existence of areas of limited statehood ea s that these fo s of assista e, hile st e gthe i g spe ifi aspe ts of a ou t s se u it context, reinforce some domestic actors vis-à-vis others thanks to processes of selective borrowing by local political elites. This paper demonstrates how such processes can further contribute to the p olife atio of h id ele e ts i the ou t s se u it se to . I t o o t asti g ase studies, e illustrate how security assistance packages in Lebanon and Tunisia have ended up diluting emerging democratic reforms, and produced more coercive manifestation of state power.
Introduction
Security assistanceactivities that aim to train, equip, reform and advise foreign security forces 1is at the fo ef o t of i te atio al a to s e gage e t a oss the Magh e a d the Le a t. Disillusio ed by the failures of externally-driven statebuilding, contemporary security assistance is increasingly post-i te e tio ist , as the liberal democratic aims of the statebuilding era have been replaced with pragmatic and ad hoc donor assistance presented as light footprints and technical assistance.
However, such post-interventionist security assistance is likely to have effects that go much beyond effectiveness and enhanced capabilities.
Drawing on empirical research into the modality and effect of security governance in Tunisia and Lebanon, two emblematic cases of contemporary security assistance in the Maghreb and the Levant, the paper makes two key arguments. First, in lieu of comprehensive political strategies with set objectives for security interventions, domestic security actorsstate and non-state, military and civilianselectively borrow from external models of security governance. These sub-national strategies must be understood and analysed in the context of the limited statehood in which they ope ate, e o d edu tio ist la els su h as spoile s . Cu e t se u it assista e e gages ith sustate and, if not directly with so in spaces where non-state actors operate, and the consequences of these engagements must be understood at both local and national levels. Second, the aggregated effect of uncoordinated, pragmatic security assistance is the creation of empowered security actors, and in this article, we discern a tendency towards either militarization of traditionally civilian tasks as is the case in Lebanon, or of unintended de-democratization effect by favouring ad hoc and supposedly technical changes without new normative frameworks in the security sector, as is the case in post-2011 Tunisia.
Two strands of literature have particular relevance for exposing current practices and effects of security assistance as it is currently unfolding in the Maghreb and Levant: literature on the changing nature of international-local linkages in the context of security governance, and research on the nature of Middle Eastern and North African political regimes. There are clear links between these two literatures, but they rarely intersect in productive ways. The first strand has exposed the shift from there is considerable external power projected onto local societies also in this new era of security governance, and the challenge remains to trace and explore such power dynamics. Despite a decreasingly normative discourse, external security assistance is far from normatively or politically neutral and continues to respond to political objectives and interests.
The second strand of research is concerned with conceptualising how fragile political orders outside the Western orbit, which undertake change or reform in their security sector, become sites of contestation between existing systems and external interferences or influences, and often develop mixed orders. Namely, far from being automatically tra sposed i thi d ou t ies setti gs, external solutio s become part of a wider process of negotiation between external actors and local political societies, which, despite ever existing power asymmetries, enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and political agency, which they make use of when taking decisions over security reforms. The hybridity emerging from the negotiation between local practices and external solutions manifests itself in potentially contradictory and ambivalent changes linked to partial and adapted transfers of norms, institutions, practices within existing normative and organizational structures (Schroeder, Chappuis and Kocak 2014; Hanau Santini and Moro 2017) .
Hybrid forms of security governance are especially the product of the interaction between external security assistance and security demands by fragile political orders. In so-called Areas of Limited Statehood (ALS), the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force are not given. In these polities, non-state actors, including external ones, and non-hierarchical modes of steering are systematic. The restriction of statehood can occur on different levels: functional or sectoral (only in some policy areas); territorial (only on some parts of the territory); temporal (only for a certain amount of time) and social (only with regard to specific parts of the population) (Risse 2013 
Global Security Governance practices and the politics of the technical
Global security governance has gone through generations of scholarly attention, reflecting changing practices on the one hand, and scholarly trends on the other. We may arguably divide the field of e e t i te e tio studies i to th ee ai ti e pe iods: li e al pea e uildi g opti is of the 1990s; critical peace studies of the 2000s; and a rejuvenated post-interventionist era characterising the 2010s. The normative perspective, the ontological and epistemological premises have changed significantly during these periods. In general, we have witnessed an increasingly critical scholarly articulation of the processes defining security governance, and a broadening of the ontology under scrutiny. Whereas the practice has changed in parallel, current security governance as it unfolds in the Maghreb and the Levant is both a product of and reproducing past generations of security interventionism.
The core aspect of security governance that intervention studies have grappled with throughout these broadly defined periods, is the composition and effect of international-local interactions and linkages.
What happens when the international (or external) enters into a d eets the lo al o do esti ?
During the 1990s, most scholars were cautiously optimistic about the prospect of international intervention in conflict affected areas, and their analyses centred on the (unfulfilled) potential of international efforts to protect conflict affected societies. Whether through peacekeepers or the introduction of liberal norms and governance models, the outlook was largely one whereby the international community did not do enough in weak or fragile states and societies that were ridden by i il st ife a d eth i o othe ise o u al o fli t (Doyle and Sambanis 2006) . This optimistic outlook gradually changed, as the failures or shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding in cases such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan, in conjunction with the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the devastating invasion of Iraq, radicalised not only its protagonists but also researchers of interventions during the first half of the 2000s. This led to an increasingly critical intellectual articulation of the aims, means and outcomes of activities under the heading of global liberal governance, which scholars saw as a practice ultimately aiming to reproduce the Western liberal state (Ignatieff 2003; Richmond 2005; Chandler 2006 ). The tension and corrosive character of international-local relationship were thus e posed, e eali g that i posi g glo al o s o f a tu ed a d o te tious polities assumed to be blank slates was not only futile; it was inherently neo-colonial (Darby 2009). In parallel, the international community gradually turned away from statebuilding as a favoured intervention practice. This was partly due to its obvious lack of success, but also due to public opposition to risking Yet, it is notor no longerfriction between pre-conceived global norms and local actors or realities that take centre stage in current security assistance, and certainly not in the Maghreb and the Levant. Complexity approaches, contrary to thinking about this shift as a depoliticised rupture with liberalism, depict this shift as effe ti el p odu i g a g o i g ilita izatio of the so ial a d the e eryday (see Moe and Mueller 2017: Khalili 2013; Niva 2013) .
This leads us to briefly consider a third app oa h to e plo i g ho the lo al tu i i te e tio s connects global ideas, discourses and practices with political societies targeted by security assistance programs. Summing up, this section has pointed to the recalibrated nature of security interventions, and the politicised effect it has on local communities rather than central authorities. In the next section, we explore how political systems characterized by areas of limited statehood in the Maghreb and the Levant demand specific conceptualizations as to the modality and effects of security assistance, with a special focus on how we can understand implications for delicate state-society relations.
The effects of Security Assistance in areas of limited statehood
This paper aims at further exploring a still under-studied topic in international security which revolves around the shapes and effects produced by the interaction between external actors engaging in security assistance and domestic actors in contexts characterized by Areas of Limited Statehood, by looking at two empirical cases in the MENA region, Tunisia and Lebanon.
While finding the notion of hybridity fruitful as far as it captures a wide range of degrees of security governance solutions resulting from the combination of local and international elements, different conceptual lenses, such as ALS, can offer more fine-grained insights when analysing these local political orders. The article will namely refer to states displaying areas of limited statehood, be they geographic and/or functional.
Hybridity has been referred to as combining different kinds of agency, external and domestic, with only partially overlapping logics (Schroder, Chappuis, Kocac 2014). By other authors, hybridity has been used to depict the coexistence of traditional and modern forms of authority, making up fundamental mechanisms of everyday governance (Bacik 2008; Fregonese 2012) . To their merit, these approaches contribute to a broader understanding of domestic agency, and successfully rectify the Reform packages can be articulated along three dimensions, whose elements can be selectively adopted in isolation one from the other: at the meta-level, we find the transformation of norms and rules of the security sector, at the meso-level, the transformation of the organizational structure and at the micro-level the transfer of practices, or technical capacities (Schroder, Chappuis and Kokak 2014).
The qualitative empirical analysis in the second part of the paper aims at illustrating how transposing a normative agenda have been fraught with shortcomings and deficiencies and how alternative efforts of o e sta da d a d supposedl te h i al "A, ha e ee o e su essfull egotiated ith lo al elites. Understanding how local contexts and external normativities form assemblages with important consequences for domestic politics will be at the core of the empirical analysis, with special attention to lo al age ts apa it to adapt i te atio al se u it age das to se e su -national interests.
Between a rock and a hard place: post-revolutionary Tunisia' security sector
Post-revolutionary Tunisia represents an interesting example of the hybridity that can be generated once different external security assistance packages are proposed, negotiated, selectively borrowed and implemented according to the domestic political preferences of some key policy actors. While in the early stages of the transition, Tunisians converged over the idea of a complete overhaul of the security sector, which, under Ben Ali had developed increasingly authoritarian practices, behaving like a community police without oversight and amounting to a modern form of hyper-localized surveillance system (Hibou 2006) , the democratization of the security forces initially foreseen failed to take place. Tunisia in the early aftermath of the uprising in 2011 asked the EU to come forward with a Security Sector Reform agenda as part and parcel of its democratization process. Once political assassinations shook the ou t s f agile e uili iu i 2013, however, priorities shifted and so did political equilibria. A formal decision over the adoption of a SSR package took a long time to be finalised and even longer to be implemented. By no means this indicated a lack of changes in the broad security sector, which tended to occur mostly on the operational level, within an altogether different multilateral policy framework, that of the G7+. The security assistance format inaugurated with the G7+ in late 2015, in the wake of the Bardo and Sousse terrorist attacks, provided more flexible arrangements. The Tunisian government negotiated the kind of assistance, mostly in terms of training and infrastructures, that it wished to receive. The European Security Sector Reform agenda, with its emphasis on transferring norms and rules proved to be less appealing than a multilateral and flexible framework involving also non-European countries, including the United States, willing to offer new policy tools, most notably technical capacities, and, to some extent, although remaining mostly at an informal level, changes in the organizational structures, with a centralization of coordination tasks in the hands of the Tunisian Presidency of the Republic.
The rest of the analysis on the Tunisian case study will expand on how from an initial EU SSR package foreseeing transfer of norms and of capacities, the shift, caused by a combination of historical contingent factors (the two terrorist attacks and the need to respond quickly in order to increase the efficiency of counter-terrorism operations as well as the charisma and powers of the President of the Republic Caid Beji Essebsi) has ended up reinforcing the efficacy of the security forces without contributing to deeper changes in the norms and rules regulating the use of force by the security sector.
In the immediate wake of the Tunisian uprising, the urgency of reforming a discredited security sector was widely shared. Under intense public pressures, the interim government in place between January and October 2011 adopted swift measures in order to purge the security bodies from their most Deauville partnership, which had until then neglected the security dimension of cooperation.
Following on a formal Tunisian request, the G7 group also included Spain, Belgium, and the EU, and became the G7+.
As a coordination framework, the G7+ aims at sharing information among partners on the ongoing security-related bilateral initiatives with Tunisia. It operates with an executive committee, meeting every three months and providing strategic guidelines, and a number of operational working groups.
In terms of increasing efficiency of technical assistance, the G7+, as compared to separate, potentially competing and overlapping bilateral security initiatives by the EU and the US, has offered key advantages. First, it has allowed to include the United States in security cooperation, while not depriving altogether EU member states to continue their bilateral initiatives, within a framework characterised by a slightly more transparent information sharing mechanism which on the one hand limits duplications and on the other provides less incentives for the Tunisian authorities to ask different donors for similar tools and resources. On the Tunisian side, the initiative has required an in any way » would be punishable by a three-year prison sentence (Article 11) (Szakal 2017) . Within a cherrypicking approach as the one encouraged by the G7+ which co-exists with ongoing bilateral initiatives and fails to provide an overall consistent reform format, there is little incentive that external actors, even if they wanted to, could deploy in order to push for normatively inspired security sector reforms.
To conclude, the exogenous shock represented by two terrorist attacks was capitalized both by key 
The reinforced hybridity of the Lebanese security governance
Security Assistance to Lebanon takes place within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1701 of 2006, which called for Le a o to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon UN"C . Afte de ades u de " ia ilita o t ol, 'esolutio pa ed the a for unprecedented investment by Western donors and their allies in security assistance to the poorly developed and deeply sectarian Lebanese security agencies. The bonanza that has ensued, whereby multiple and at times competing donors support their specific niche, is still poorly understood. In particular, the effects such sustained external support to specific security agencies have, in the absence of a coherent and coordinated strategy, on Lebanese statehood is as of yet not uncovered.
Resolution 1701 was designed to disarm powerful contenders to Lebanese state structures, but the loosely defined mandate and intensification of geostrategic competition in the Middle East in recent years have deepened and widened the hybrid nature of Lebanese security governance.
Hybridity in Lebanon is descriptive of the coexistence of formal and informal socio-political structures, which interact and compete so to make up a truly hybrid security order. The lengthy civil war in Lebanon (1975 Lebanon ( -1990 , commonly thought to be a rather shallow mechanism, with little actual coordination capacity. It issues statements in times of crises and provides the veneer of donor coordination, but given the complex dynamics of Lebanese security politics it is unlikely to address thorny issues that security assistance is confronted with on the ground. It is probably fair to say that most donors prefer this lack of transparency, as centralization and formalization in Lebanon implies paralyzing negotiations over resource distribution. Lack of stated objectives, moreover, allows the proliferation of short-term projects and changes along the way without significant accountability attached.
Weakly coordinated security assistance is a practice with parallels across the world. While the EU keeps o p o oti g "e u it "e to 'efo i so e lo alities, su h as i Tu isia, it is t do e so i Lebanon, primarily because there is no political interestamong domestic or international actorsfor such restructuring of the security sector. Instead, strategic concerns drive security assistance in Lebanon, notably seeking to beef up national institutions (at the expense of non-state forces) in order to preserve stability along the Blue Line in the South, cooperate with UNIFIL in that respect, protect the ou t s o de s f o spill-over from the war in Syria, prevent terrorist safe heavens, and manage global flows of people and goods from passing through. While these are all key ingredients in classic statebuilding processes, security assistance is also molded by more specific geopolitical concerns: the geostrategic relationship between Lebanon and Israel, and the role of Hezbollah as a proxy of Iranian influence. Managing and balancing these concerns are key to unpacking the modality and effects of security assistance in Lebanon.
The surge in security assistance then, is largely taking place without an overarching strategic framework or coordination mechanisms. It is striking to note the lack of a normative model pursued Western donors, but it is also official that coordination works on an informal level, and along a i he app oa h , in which each donor operates in a given niche, and there is tacit understanding that each niche is exclusive unless otherwise agreed. Guiding principles for the what, who and how of security assistance are perceived rather than explicit, and must be seen in a geopolitical context, where
Lebanon is a battleground between powerful interests in the region. Fo e a ple, ai tai i g Is ael s
Qualitative Military Edge prevents the delivery of heavy and strategic weapons, but nowhere is this written or codified.
Effects of SA on hybridity are first of all the deepening of sectarian division and competition. Donors are keen to enter into specific niches in order to remain relevant and influential, with the consequence that ea h do o ou t has its pa t e i stitutio to hi h it ha els fu ds, t ai i g a d,
eventually, normative ideas about how to organize efficient security provision. For example, the US and the UK are the main donors working with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), while France works primarily with General Security (GS) and the specific niche of airport security. The US has also invested considerably in developing the Internal Security Forces (ISFthe police), while the EU runs a longer term project on border management. Lebanese security institutions are steeped in sectarian politics: a fine balance between Le a o s a se ts is ai tai ed th ough appoi t e ts a d eshuffles.
The ISF is headed by a Sunni, GS by a Shia, and the various leadership positions of the LAF is allocated across the confessional spectrum (see Nerguizian 2015, pp. 115-116 Mo eo e , "A ith o st i gs atta hed o t i utes to suppo t the ta it pa t e ship et ee the LAF and Hezbollah, which contravenes the mandate of Resolution 1701 but which most analysts see as a necessity in the Lebanese context. Hezbollah is probably the best armed organization, the most influential political party, and the most efficient social welfare provider, which makes it a force impossible to avoid in the dense Lebanese landscape. The relationship between LAF and Hezbollah has always been nurtured and sustained through tacit agreement and accommodation (Alami 2014) .
For international actors, that relationship has been problematic and controversial; for the Lebanese it is esse tial to a agi g e e da se u it politi s, a d Hez ollah s a ati e of a ed esista e against Israeli aggression is to some extent accepted also beyond its core sympathizers. 12 years after Resolution 1701, the LAF is a strengthened force with capacities and capabilities beyond expectations (Shabb 2014 ). Yet, also Hezbollah has enlarged its role and considerably boosted its capabilities, particularly through its engagement in the Syrian civil war, which has showcased its military strength and prompted new recruitment and increased weapons supplies by its Syrian and Iranian backers.
Meanwhile, the Sunni community in Lebanon is wary of the LAF-Hezbollah cooperation in targeting e t e ist "u i g oups, especially in hotspots such as Arsal and generally in the Bekaa valley along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Sunni-Shia tension has soured further in the already tense environment that has seen fierce political factionalism since the murder of p eside t Ha i i i . The LAF has al a s ee e e ed as the o l t ul atio al i stitutio , and while this self-styled narrative is somewhat inflated, popular support for the LAF depends on the continued perception of such neutrality. In a series of events, much applauded by Western donors, the LAF has cracked down on Islamist groups, appearing to withstand pressure from the volatile border with Syria. It is evident that these crackdowns could not have taken place without Hezbollah collusion, and their increased cooperation has been well documented (Schenker 2017 "o e ha e des i ed Le a o as a ase of h id so e eig t , ade up of a asse lage of diffe e t actors and interests, and constituent of a system of plural governance of security (Hazbun 2016) . What we can also observe is that external normativities are channeled through security assistance packages, and that this hybridityevidenced in particular through the LAF-Hezbollah evolving relationshipis deepening as a consequence.
Conclusions
Security Assistance models and practices have taken different shapes in Tunisia and Lebanon and yet display striking similarities. While in Tunisia efforts at a comprehensive SSR package have been initiated in the aftermath of the 2010/2011 uprisings, although they have only very slowly made progress and their implementation remains far-fetched, in both countries ad hoc, pragmatic and technical capacity oriented Security Assistance frameworks have been designed. In both cases, they have no strings attached, and they have ended up reinforcing hybrid features of the local political systems, while strengthening security institutions and enhancing the overall security performance of the local institutions.
The Tunisian government has sele ti el o o ed a specific form of multilateral SA framework, the G7+, which operates on a bilateral basis, with the aim of building capacity among security agencies without pushing for changes in the discredited legislative or organizational frameworks regulating the security sector, a heavy legacy of the previous authoritarian regime. Tunisian agency has manifested itself in the elaboration and adoption of new security strategies, spearheaded by the Presidency of the Republic, beyond negotiations over t ai a d e uip ele e ts foreseen by the G7+. Eventually, however, supposedly technical and locally demanded reforms ended up reinforcing elements of hybridity in the security arena if not altogether in the Tunisian political system. This occurred with a parallel process of increased efficiency enabled by the streamlining of the security decision-making process, an improved inter-ministerial coordination and greater cooperation facing security threats, and, on the other hand, with the continuing existence of hybrid, when not authoritarian, provisions and laws aimed at granting impunity, lack of accountability of the security forces vis-à-vis citizens. The tailor-made SA by external donors, moreover, impacted on the evolving nature of the Tunisian political system, by strengthening the Presidency of the Republic, which, despite a constitutional emphasis on parliamentary democracy, widened its powers and, by opaquely steering the decision-making in the security arena, decreased the role of both the parliament and the government, represented by the prime minister.
In Lebanon, where statehood is limited both functionally, with a non-state actor, Hezbollah, playing an essential role on the coercive level, as well as geographically, with the southern part of the country remaining a strategic area of concern for the central authority unable to unequivocally assert its predominance once and for all, strategic concerns have driven security assistance. This has occurred notably under the guise of the UN led Support Group for Lebanon, which has failed to stir donor coordination, and evaded discussions of strategic direction and political ownership over the security sector, which has increased the degree of hybridity already displayed by the complex Lebanese political system. Different SA donors have failed to clearly spell out their SA models, and focused on specific niches such as counter-terrorism, border-control and management of migration. This has meant ending up pursuing different geopolitical priorities on the ground, including beefing up national institutions (at the expense of non-state forces) in order to preserve stability along the Blue Line in the South, cooperating with UNIFIL, protecting the ou t s o de s f o spill-overs from Syria, preventing the creation of terrorist safe heavens, and managing migratory flows. The first and foremost consequence of such uncoordinated SA has been the deepening of sectarian division and competition among aid recipients. Hybridity, in this case, has been a function of individual donors wishes to cultivate relations with specific sectarian groups and clients so as to preserve their influence.
The complexity turn, with its focus on interaction between external donors and local central authorities negotiating the terms of engagement, offers some clues as to how the current intensity in security assistance impacts on the ground. When coupled with a more functionalist framework such as that of Areas of Limited Statehood, we begin to discern how local political elites harness donor priorities to serve particular sub-state interests. In both cases analysed in this article, external security assistance has significantly impacted upon local political orders undergoing change or transformation within volatile environments and has increased the hybrid features of local security governance settings. In both Tunisia and Lebanon, the influence played by external donors in strengthening selected local actors and favouring hybrid forms of sovereignty, is indicative of the new generation of o ple it app oa hes in security assistance. Despite a decreasingly normative discourse, contemporary interventions have implications for security governance and subsequently for political processes in the target country. It is of utmost importance to further research what the lack of comprehensive approach to security assistance means for domestic politicsin the Middle East and North Africa, and beyond.
